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Umair Zaffar November 3, 2026 0 Comments

EU AI Act Article 19: Log Retention, Implemented in Practice

EU AI Act Article 19 requires the provider to keep the automatically generated logs of its high-risk system, to the extent they are under its control, for at least six months; Article 18 requires the documentation to be kept for ten years. For us both are configuration: one retention rule per registry record, enforced by the evidence log itself, with legal hold, deletion with proof and read access for authorities.

Article 12 says what a high-risk system must be able to log; it has its own post. Articles 19 and 18 answer the unglamorous questions that follow: who keeps it, for how long, under whose control, and what happens on deletion. Both address the provider through Art. 16(d) and (e); the deployer has a mirror image for the logs in Art. 26(6). In projects, Article 19 settles two things nobody clarified before: whether the logs live with the software vendor or with the customer, and whether data protection gets to delete them.

The EU AI Act has been in force since 1 August 2024. The prohibitions and the AI literacy duty have applied since February 2025, the obligations for GPAI models since August 2025, the transparency obligations under Article 50 since August 2026. The obligations for high-risk systems under Annex III apply, after the postponement by the amending Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus), from 2 December 2027, and for Annex I products from 2 August 2028. Articles 18 and 19 belong to these high-risk obligations. The Omnibus moved deadlines; it removed no obligation.

What EU AI Act Article 19 and Article 18 require

Two short articles, two different clocks: the log period runs from the event, the documentation period from the placing on the market.

  • Art. 19(1): Providers keep the logs referred to in Art. 12(1) to the extent those logs are under their control. The period must be appropriate to the intended purpose and at least six months, unless Union or national law, in particular data protection law, provides otherwise. The clause “under their control” is the most important one in the article.
  • Art. 19(2): Providers that are financial institutions subject to governance requirements under Union financial services law maintain the logs as part of their documentation under that law.
  • Art. 18(1): Providers keep at the disposal of the national competent authorities, for ten years after the system has been placed on the market or put into service: the technical documentation under Article 11, the documentation of the quality management system under Article 17, where applicable the changes approved by notified bodies and the decisions and documents those bodies issued, and the EU declaration of conformity under Article 47.
  • Art. 18(2): Each Member State determines the conditions under which that documentation remains available if the provider or its authorised representative goes bankrupt or ceases activity before the ten years end.
  • Art. 18(3): Financial institutions may maintain the technical documentation as part of the documentation they keep under Union financial services law.
  • The connected articles: Art. 21(2) obliges the provider to give an authority access to the logs upon a reasoned request, again to the extent they are under its control. Art. 26(6) imposes the same retention duty on the deployer, with the same financial-institution clause.

Keeping at the disposal of authorities means findable and readable, not stored somewhere. And six months is a floor that purpose and sector law open upwards and data protection opens downwards.

The technical example

A document classification model: it sorts incoming applications, objections and attachments, assigns them to cases and extracts fields. One provider runs it for several public authorities as a hosted service, one tenant per authority. The same model runs on-premise at a bank, for customer documents on credit applications. Whether that is high-risk depends on whether the sorting feeds into decisions about benefits or credit; here we assume it does.

Case A, hosted. The authority uploads documents, the provider’s gateway pseudonymises, classifies and writes the decision record into the provider’s evidence log. The logs are under the provider’s control, so Article 19 applies to the provider. The authority is a deployer with the duty under Art. 26(6), but technically controls nothing. If the contract is silent, it holds not a single record after the contract ends, although its records law demands far more than six months.

Case B, on-premise. At the bank a separate gateway instance runs and the logs are created in the bank’s evidence log. The provider has no control over them, so its duty under Article 19 is empty for these logs. The bank keeps them under Art. 26(6) as part of its documentation under financial services law, that is, under its own periods, which are counted in years. The provider delivers the capability under Article 12 and a retention configuration the bank adopts. Its own documentation under Article 18 it keeps itself in both cases.

Where it bites: fourteen months later a citizen objects because his application sat in the wrong unit. Three years later the supervisor examines a credit refusal at the bank that began with a misread document. And in four years the provider winds down. For each of these three cases it has to be settled today who will still have the data.

How we implement it

At SIFAMO, retention is not a setting in the storage system but part of the registry record in the governance layer. The evidence log reads the rule and enforces it.

The retention rule lives in the registry record

Every use case has a retention block, signed at the registration gate by the business owner, risk and IT. Simplified, for the hosted public-sector case:

{
  "use_case_id": "DE-OEFF-2026-0021",
  "deployment": "hosted, one tenant per authority",
  "log_controller": "provider",
  "retention": {
    "legal_floor_days": 183,
    "purpose_days": 730,
    "sector_override": {"basis": "deployer's records law", "days": null, "set_by": "tenant"},
    "payload_days": 180,
    "effective": "max(legal_floor, purpose, sector_override)"
  },
  "legal_hold": {"active": false, "set_by": ["legal", "compliance"]},
  "deletion": {"mode": "scheduled", "proof": "tombstone + signed anchor"},
  "authority_access": {"role": "read-only", "scope": "tenant + time window", "logged": true},
  "documentation": {"retention_years": 10, "clock": "placing on the market, per version", "store": "write-once"},
  "signed_by": ["business", "risk", "it"], "signed_at": "2026-11-18"
}

The legal floor is hard-wired; a record with a shorter purpose period fails validation at the gate. The purpose period is justified by the business owner; in procedures where objections arrive months later, ours is two years. The sector override belongs to the tenant: the authority enters the period from its records law, the bank the period from its financial services law. The longest one wins. The payload follows a shorter period from data protection, because hash and pseudonym stay verifiable while the pseudonymised text does not have to. In the bank case the log_controller field names the deployer, and the block ships with the instructions for use under Article 13.

The log enforces the rule itself

Exactly one identity has delete rights on the evidence store: the retention job. It reads the block from the registry, not a ticket and not a lifecycle policy of the storage. Before the effective period ends it cannot delete; after the payload period ends it must. Only someone who collects three signatures changes the period.

Legal hold

A hold freezes deletion for a use case, a tenant or an ID range. Legal and compliance may set it, engineering may not. Triggers are complaints, authority requests under Article 21, corrective actions under Article 20 and incidents. Setting and lifting a hold are events in the same chain. An email saying “please do not delete anything” is not a hold.

Deletion with proof

When the job deletes, it appends a tombstone record: range of IDs, count, last hash of the deleted segment, the rule version applied, timestamp. The record is signed like the daily anchor and stored outside engineering’s reach. The auditor sees that these decisions existed and when and under which rule they were deleted; the chain remains verifiable. The earlier payload deletion in the gray data zone gets its own tombstone. That is how we resolve the conflict between Article 19 and storage limitation: the proof outlives the content.

Access for authorities

For Art. 21(2) nobody gets a database login. There is an authority role: read-only, limited to tenant and time window, through the same read view the internal auditor uses, plus export as JSONL with a chain verification file and as PDF. Every access is an event in the log, and the request itself sets a hold. In the hosted case each authority triggers the export for its own tenant; provider and authority meet their duties from the same log, and after the contract ends the authority has its copy.

Ten years for the documentation

The dossier under Article 11, the QMS documentation under Article 17, the declaration of conformity and, where they exist, the notified body’s documents are stored write-once, the hash signed at risk. We start the clock per version at release, because a substantial modification is a new placing on the market and I do not want to argue in ten years about which version a period belonged to. The QMS state is frozen with every release. For Art. 18(2) the national rules are missing; until then the deployer receives, by contract, a copy of dossier and anchors at every release. Financial institutions fold this into their existing documentation under Art. 18(3).

The auditor sees, per use case, the retention rule with signatures, the hold history, the tombstones, the access log and every dossier version with its end date. How we introduce this is described under AI governance.

Typical mistakes

  • The period lives in the storage system. A lifecycle policy in object storage is changed from 180 to 30 days to save cost. Nobody signs, nobody notices.
  • Data protection deletes the evidence. Real names in the log, the data protection officer demands deletion, and the evidence vanishes with the content. Without separating hash and content, Article 19 loses.
  • “Under control” is never settled. The deployer believes the provider keeps the logs. The provider believes the deployer exports them. After the contract ends, nobody has anything.
  • Ten years from the first release. The dossier build overwrites the previous version; the documentation for the state that made the disputed decision is gone.

Article 19 checklist

  • For every use case it is defined and signed who controls the logs: provider or deployer, per deployment.
  • The retention rule is in the registry record with legal floor, justified purpose period, sector override and a shorter payload period.
  • Only the retention job has delete rights, and it reads nothing but the registry.
  • Legal hold is a function with roles and a log; every deletion leaves a signed tombstone.
  • Authorities get read access and an export with chain verification; every access is logged.
  • Dossier, QMS state and declaration of conformity are stored write-once per version, with an end date ten years after the release.
  • The deployer holds, by contract, a copy of the documentation and the log export.

Open questions

  • What is “appropriate”? Between the six-month floor and the years of records law there is no standard, and nobody has decided whether a log whose content is deleted and whose hash remains counts as kept. We believe it does and justify that in the registry.
  • Who makes sure somebody is in control? Article 19 and Art. 26(6) each apply “to the extent under control”. Nobody is obliged to organise that control. In the hosted case only the contract closes the gap.
  • Evidence that lasts ten years. Art. 18(2) waits for national rules. And whether a signature made today still counts as proof in ten years is a question for cryptography. We plan for re-anchoring.

Frequently asked questions

Does this apply to us as a deployer too?

For logs, yes, through Art. 26(6): keep them to the extent they are under your control, for at least six months, as a financial institution under your financial services law. On-premise you control everything. With a hosted service only what the contract gives you; demand export and read access. The ten years under Article 18 fall on the provider.

May we delete the logs after six months?

The pseudonymised content usually earlier, data protection demands it. The evidence only if neither the purpose nor your sector law demands more. In procedures about people, complaints and audits arrive later than six months. I would never plan with the floor there.

Do the ten years run per version?

In our reading, yes. Every substantial modification is a new placing on the market, so every version has its own period, and we keep every version. That costs storage, but no argument.

This post belongs to my series EU AI Act in practice. Here you find all articles at a glance.

Related: EU AI Act · All articles · AI Governance · AI Consultant

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